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The  World  Health  Organisation’s  deﬁnition  of  public  health  refers  to all organized  measures  to  prevent
disease,  promote  health,  and  prolong  life  among  the  population  as  a whole  (World  Health  Organization,
2014). Mathematical  modelling  plays  an  increasingly  important  role  in  helping  to guide  the  most  high
impact  and  cost-effective  means  of  achieving  these  goals.  Public  health  programmes  are  usually  imple-
mented  over  a  long  period  of  time  with  broad  beneﬁts  to many  in the community.  Clinical  trials  are
seldom  large  enough  to  capture  these  effects.  Observational  data  may  be used  to  evaluate  a programme
after  it  is underway,  but  have  limited  value  in  helping  to  predict  the future  impact  of a proposed  policy.
Furthermore,  public  health  practitioners  are  often  required  to respond  to new  threats,  for  which  thereommunication
ncertainty
urden
is little  or  no  previous  data  on  which  to assess  the  threat.  Computational  and  mathematical  models  can
help to assess  potential  threats  and  impacts  early  in the process,  and  later  aid in  interpreting  data  from
complex  and  multifactorial  systems.  As  such,  these  models  can  be critical  tools  in guiding  public  health
action.  However,  there  are  a number  of  challenges  in  achieving  a  successful  interface  between  modelling
and public  health.  Here,  we  discuss  some  of  these  challenges.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).ntroduction
The interface between modelling and public health plays out
n diverse forums. Modellers may  be invited to join working
roups for a speciﬁc and general issue, e.g., in the development
f World Health Organization position papers (e.g., World Health
rganization, 2011) or to aid with planning for the public health
esponse to an emerging or potential public health threat. For
nstance, modelling played an important role in pandemic plan-
ing and the response to the 2009 pandemic in the U.S., the U.K.
nd elsewhere (Germann et al., 2006; Ferguson et al., 2006). Models
ay  also play an important role in estimating disease burden and
he evaluation of public health questions (e.g., progress towards
easles mortality goals (Simons et al., 2012)). In all cases, a varied
erception of modelling and attitude towards its utility for public
ealth is likely to be represented – ranging from the very negative
o the indifferent to positive. Negative positions may  be largely a
unction of high expectations relative to what can actually be deliv-
red. In the below, we detail some of the challenges that emerge
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 609 258 6228.
E-mail address: cmetcalf@princeton.edu (C.J.E. Metcalf).
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2014.08.008
755-4365/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unfor modelling in this context, ranging from fundamental issues, to
more concrete, speciﬁc ones.
1. Communicating the limits of modelling
The public health practitioner might prefer clear quantitative
statements of the outcomes of control strategies or the future
impact of health threats. Models are rarely in a position to provide
this. Communicating exactly why this is the case is key to making
modelling useful for public health.
Communicating how model projections depend on underlying
assumptions is essential, as problematic assumptions can lead to
ﬂawed public health projections (Cooper, 2006). The details of mod-
els of the time-course of infection, in particular, are central to
predicting infection trajectories for individuals, and thus scaling
up to populations (Wallinga and Lipsitch, 2007). If these underly-
ing models are poorly deﬁned, subsequent modelling is necessarily
very speculative. This issue is a particular challenge in emerging
infections, where there is a paucity of evidence on the time course
of disease (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2014). In addition to communicat-
ing the challenges they face, the modelling community may also be
able to improve public health response by increasing awareness of
the critical pieces of data needed to model emerging threats.
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Appropriate assumptions will depend on the purposes of the
odelling. However, even with the most appropriate assump-
ions in place, the quantitative predictions desired by the public
ealth practitioner are unlikely to be feasible for most problems.
odelling generally performs well in contrasting very general
ypothetical scenarios (strategy A is more successful than strat-
gy B); but poorly in quantitatively predicting outcomes of speciﬁc
ontexts (strategy A will reduce cases by 27.2%). Modellers need
o meet the challenge of communicating the distinction between
scenarios” and “predictions”, where “scenarios” can be thought
f as what could happen if x, y and z hold, and “predictions”
re our best guess of what will actually happen given what
e know about the state of the system (i.e., epidemic) at the
oment.
The tension around ‘prediction’ comes from both sides. As sci-
ntists, modellers are often uncomfortable producing multiple
cenarios, all of which are based on assumptions that are poorly
upported, and feel more comfortable with a single scenario based
n their best evidence. At the same time, policy makers often want
 clear, single number to use for concrete actions, and may  face
igniﬁcant criticism if this number is perceived to be wrong (e.g.,
 vaccination threshold). Hence both sides have pressure to come
p with numbers that can be perceived as predictions, even if all
nvolved are well aware that the intention is only to make plan-
ing scenarios. By becoming more integrated in the public health
rocess the modelling community can reduce occurrences of mis-
nterpretation and perhaps ﬁnd ways that predictive modelling
ould usefully be incorporated into the process of public health
see points 4 and 5 below).
If the assumptions are reasonable, and the model performs
ell in contrasting scenarios, the next challenge may  be commu-
icating the limits of performance of the model – in particular,
ome models perform well under the conditions for which they
ere developed but break down when the context changes. For
xample, when populations reach small numbers, deterministic
odels may  fail spectacularly (as in the example of the ‘Atto’ fox
llowing re-invasion of rabies without reintroduction from an out-
ide source (Mollison, 1991)); shifts in incidence may  also make
opulation heterogeneities more important (e.g., the Ross McDon-
ld model of malaria has been extended to capture aspects of
mmune dynamics and transmission heterogeneities (Smith et al.,
012)).
Finally, a slightly counter-intuitive issue in communicating the
imits of modelling is the challenge of communicating when some-
hing is a model at all – i.e., burden of disease estimates at global or
ational scales are usually based on models (generally phenomeno-
ogical rather than mechanistic), but are not necessarily identiﬁed
s such, even by their creators, and taken as ‘truth’, and thus pre-
ented without any consideration of uncertainty.
. Maintaining the value of models in the face of long time
orizons
Models often make qualitative predictions that play out over
ecades. Classic examples include the shift in the age proﬁle of
ncidence following vaccination for rubella (Knox, 1980); or the
xistence of honeymoon periods as a consequence of success-
ul control that may  be followed by large outbreaks for measles
Mclean and Anderson, 1988) and other childhood infections (e.g.,
risson and Edmunds, 2003). The natural history and pathogenesis
f diseases such as tuberculosis or HPV mean it may  take genera-
ions for the effects of interventions or other changes to the system
o be seen at any signiﬁcant level. Such long time frames of pro-
ection make it very hard to validate predictions, and seriously
ffect what modellers can and cannot say; particularly since manyics 10 (2015) 93–96
model assumptions are unlikely to hold over the years or decades
required for these predictions to play out. Modellers must identify
approaches to clarify the value of such predictions despite their
likely inaccuracies and highlight predictions that must be revisited
in the face of situational changes. The development of methods,
both technical and operational, of updating and checking model
assumptions as more data becomes available or assumptions lose
validity will require collaboration with those working on the pol-
icy side. Such methods have the potential to create models that can
be used in ongoing planning (e.g., for continual reassessment of
outbreak risk during the honeymoon period). However, maintain-
ing systems over the long term is a challenge (an issue that is, of
course, not unique to modelling) as enthusiasm wanes or as people
lose sight of original goals.
3. Usefully deploying modelling in the context of ‘black
swans’
Unexpected events are a repeated feature of our experience of
infectious disease. Models cannot anticipate rare events, such as
the emergence of HIV. However, models can potentially be used
to prepare for low probability, high impact events (often referred
to as black swans). Challenges include the fact that low probabil-
ity events are inherently likely to be under-represented in data
streams (i.e., the tails of parameter distributions). For example,
individuals with high numbers of sexual partners are key to the
spread of HIV, but quantifying their role and partner change rates
was a major challenge, resulting in large scale surveys of sex-
ual behaviour in many countries around the globe (Liljeros et al.,
2001). There are also technical and analytical directions in which
expansion of our capacity for the modelling of rare events is still
somewhat underserved.
A classic example of a low probability high impact event is a
rare, lethal pandemic. In the early half of the last decade there
was a ﬂurry of interest in preparing and planning for an inﬂuenza
pandemic, spurred on by sporadic human infections and deaths
with H5N1 avian inﬂuenza. Many of these models showed a poten-
tial utility for antivirals in the control or response to a pandemic
(Germann et al., 2006; Ferguson et al., 2005), with containment
perhaps even being possible if the emergent strain was  detected
early enough. These models were centred around a black swan
event, the emergence of an extremely virulent pandemic inﬂuenza
strain, and admitted the possibility of another arguably unlikely
event, the very early detection of human-to-human transmission.
When the awaited pandemic eventually occurred in 2009, it proved
to be mild, and had already spread widely in Mexico by the time
it was  detected. Subsequently, governments, international organi-
zations and modellers were subject to criticism for unnecessarily
stockpiling antivirals and causing panic (Doshi, 2011; Hine, 2010).
This is despite the fact that models and policy makers were aim-
ing for, and may  have achieved, the best possible plan for a rare,
catastrophic event – that has happily not yet occurred. While not
necessarily the fault of the modellers (though they may  have con-
tributed), this planning process also left many with the impression
that all inﬂuenza pandemics will be catastrophic, high case fatal-
ity, events. Appropriately helping in planning while not fuelling
misperceptions of risk is a difﬁcult challenge – particularly as, by
deﬁnition, there will be very little actual information on what a
black swan event will be like. Values and perception of values are
a crucial consideration in this dialogue (Tversky and Kahneman,strikingly different terms, both modellers and policy makers should
work hard to frame rare, probabilistic outcomes in terms that are
desirable. This is particularly challenging in black swan situations
where very little is known about any of the outcomes.
pidem
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. Integrating modellers and model-building into the
olicy process
Following challenges 1 and 2, a major and general challenge in
odelling and policy is reducing the divide between policy makers
nd modellers. The creation of an environment where modellers
uccessfully communicate clearly how models can and should be
sed (e.g., for scenario comparison rather than projection; burden
stimation, and not prediction, etc.) and policy makers success-
ully communicate questions they want answers to is essential. One
olution may  be the development of incentives to academics that go
eyond the current reward structure that is grounded on publish-
ng novel results. Ongoing modelling support for the ‘same’ decision
ver long term is likely to be of much greater value to policy mak-
rs; and, overall, changes in the community that act to narrow the
ap between the “need to know” vs. “what is being done” should
e seriously considered. The needs are often relatively simple (e.g.,
stimation of burden, or Case Fatality Ratios (Baguelin et al., 2011))
ut what is actually being modelled may  be unnecessarily compli-
ated (pulsed vaccination, etc.) and not of great policy interest.
Creating an ongoing interaction between modellers and policy
akers rather than a one-off process will contribute greatly to this
oal. Currently, organizations such as CDC tend to enter into short-
erm project-speciﬁc arrangements with academic groups, and this
an lead to modelling teams that are poorly integrated, not updated
n all valid sources of evidence, and who may  not have enough
ime to do the work, or fully engage with the problem. The English
nd Dutch systems in which modelling teams are integrated within
he national surveillance systems are notable exceptions to this.
acilitating the process of screening quality in modelling teams is
lso an essential component of improving the interaction between
odellers and policy makers – mathematicians capable of deploy-
ng elaborate models but who know very little about epidemiology
nd public health might misdirect policy making. Responsibility for
eveloping this capacity must lie within the modelling community.
Ongoing interactions create the possibility for more effective
se of both scenario based and predictive models. Scenario based
odels can serve as the basis for war-gaming the response to high
riority public health threats, adding more realism and unpre-
ictability to training exercises. Long term prediction is a task that
odels are poorly suited to do (see challenge 2), but it may  be pos-
ible to develop a class of statistical and mechanistic models that
an provide continually updated forecasts that capture uncertainty
nd gain accuracy as new information becomes available. While
onger term predictions are unlikely to ever be accurate, forecasts
n the scale of days or weeks may  still be useful in an ongoing public
ealth response, particularly as data on even the current situation
ay  be slow to come in.
Integration of modellers within the policy making process will
lso help in deﬁning the degree of ‘realism’ that it is appropriate
o include within models. For all policy-related modelling, models
hould be simple as possible, but not so simple that a realistic relax-
tion of assumptions will alter policy recommendations. For some
cenario models, increased ‘realism’, resulting in more complex
odels with a ﬁner description of the outcomes may  be desirable.
y contrast, for models that are statistically driven, added detail
nd realism may  lead to increased uncertainty (the complexity-
ncertainty trade-off); rather than the more accurate predictions
hat one might intuitively expect.
. Economic analysis and decision supportIn public health policy, the question that one would like models
o answer is “what should I do?” What is generally required is not
imply a mean estimate of what is likely to happen, or a scenarioics 10 (2015) 93–96 95
based analysis, but rather an analysis of the cost and beneﬁts of a
set of possible public health policies to guide the decision in favour
of one over the others. Weighing of costs and beneﬁts is in the
domain of economic analysis, and a dimension generally lacking in
most infectious disease models; while at the same time economists’
models are rarely designed to account for the non-linear effects
that emerge from infectious disease dynamics. This area is ripe for
development and will play an essential role in making models more
useful in the formation of public health policy. As part of this effort,
it is essential that costs and beneﬁts and how they may  change be
an integral part of the modelling (rather than simply an add-on),
with appropriate assumptions that can be relaxed appropriately,
etc. (Brisson and Edmunds, 2003; Baguelin et al., 2010). Costs and
beneﬁts may  even feed back into model systems. For instance, the
individual beneﬁts of vaccination go down with disease risk, so
more intensive government efforts may  be needed to maintain high
rates of immunization in the face of disease elimination.
Making decisions about public health priority and the relative
cost or beneﬁt of various outcomes should not be the purview
of modellers, or even economists; but rather is the responsibil-
ity of governmental and international public health groups (World
Health Organization, 2014). It is important that policy makers
understand that if they want models that give an “answer” to a
policy decision, they must identify priorities and identify the costs
and beneﬁts important to their decision, so that modellers and
economists can work together to incorporate this into their analy-
sis. When they are able to do so, the marriage of mechanistic models
and economic analysis may  be able to provide powerful decision
support that would not be possible if the two  were combined
post hoc based on summaries of their individual results. The Joint
Committee on Vaccines and Immunization (which advises the UK
government on vaccine policy) is a good example of this in practice:
with a modeller represented on the committee, an explicit role
of economic analysis in the decision-making process, the regular
use of transmission dynamic models integrated within economic
analyses, and feedback from the committee on the assumptions
underlying the models being routinely incorporated.
6. Creating a cycle where results inform decisions and vice
versa
Each of the challenges here has both a technical component
and a communication component. Challenges in communication
may  be mitigated by establishing an initial dialogue about what
modelling has to offer and what data may  be of value, particu-
larly in light of changing technologies and novel methodologies.
This may  facilitate interactions, but does not solve the problem
that as long as modelling activities are considered as separate from
public health practice, the full potential cannot be realized. Ulti-
mately, communication issues are best resolved by creating long
term relationships that foster understanding and trust. Ongoing
relationships can avoid a “one-off” approach to modelling, and
create a cycle where models inform policy, which leads to new
data and policy questions, thereby demanding model reﬁnement.
This idealized relationship is not merely a cultural challenge, but
also requires technical innovation. Models that are more ﬂexible in
how they are updated using new information may  encourage bet-
ter ongoing interaction; or methods that speed up simulation and
check for input highly inconsistent with previous data might facil-
itate the use of models directly by the planners that will use thebarriers to creating an ongoing cycle of decision and reanalysis are
signiﬁcant, as only in such a cycle will consumers of model out-
put gain an intuition for how to interpret results, while the results
remain current and relevant to policy decisions.
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onclusions
Having national or international health policy change as a direct
onsequence of your own work can be enormously fulﬁlling for
he analyst. However, for this to occur, and to ensure that the pol-
cy adequately represents the modelling work, proper engagement
ith policy makers is necessary. Productive engagement is a long-
erm process, and involves a deeper understanding of the needs and
onstraints of policy makers combined with a willingness to alter
odels in order to try and better reﬂect these needs and constraints.
t the same time, both modellers and their policy partners must
ork hard to appropriately interpret results, in particular appro-
riately communicating uncertainty. This engagement should help
nsure that policy makers understand the limitations and con-
traints of the models better, while giving them more opportunities
o use models as tools for decisions. Deeper engagement with policy
akers will help modellers ﬁnd the best ways of communicat-
ng clear and scientiﬁcally accurate information to best guide the
evelopment of policy.
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